Communities of domination? Reconceptualising organisational learning and power

Huzzard (2004)

This paper addresses the under-theorised relationship between learning and power. It identifies:

1.     a shortcoming in situatied learning theory that it is narrowly restricted to routine labour processes, and

2.     a shortcoming in work on sensemaking, in that this has been unrelated to micro-political processes and considerations of power

The role of power in communities of practice was clearly identified by Lave & Wenger (1991) in their initial formulation of situated learning theory. Yet power has since become somewhat lost as the notion so CoPs has been subsumed within the organisationa learning literature.

Huzzard argues for a ‘conceptualisation of sensemaking, sensegiving and learning in a model of organizational change that focuses on learning through exploration in projects rather than learning through exploitation in routine activities’

Could it be argued that undergraduate courses ‘exploit students in routine activities’ – i.e. is the traditional lecture an example of this? If an UG course were reimagined as a community would student learning happen more through ‘exploration in projects’?

According to Lave & Wenger:

·       ‘the mastery of knowledge and skill requires newcomers to move toward full participation in the sociocultural practices of a community’ (1991: 29)

·       learning is a social process that ‘…includes, indeed it subsumes, the learning of knowledgeable skills’

·       knowledge of the socially constituted world is socially mediated and open ended…cognition and communication in, and with, the social world, are situated in the historical development of ongoing activity (p.51)

Situated learning theory departs from “mainstream’ accounts of learning (Gherardi et al, 1998) in that a contrary view is taken on the ontological status of knowledge:

·       in mainstream accounts, knowledge is seen as something that is objective, uncontested and unproblematically diffused to learners.

·       For Lave & Wenger, however, knowledge is socially constructed: when actors draw on new “knowledge” they attribute new meaning to it, contextualise it locally and translate it into practice through everyday interaction. New understandings are then generated retrospectively through collective reflection. Accordingly, learning has a relational character whereby the negotiation of meaning is pivotal. Although such learning can be triggered by information obtained from external sources, it is nevertheless more appropriately defined in terms of the (social) negotiation of meaning during its contextualization rather than the receipt and storage of “facts”; for example, the content of training manuals.

This is a key argument in favour of reimagining UG courses as communities. In order for this to happen, how should the role of the tutor change?

·       Traditional approaches [to learning in organisations] see knowledge as objective and learnable through data collection routines = learning as uncertainty reduction whereby understanding leads to action (Addleson, 1996; Ford & Ogilvie, 1996) Spender, 1996)

·       Situated learning sees knowledge as ambiguous and thereby subject to interpretation and trial-and-error application = learning as meaning creation whereby action leads to understanding (Addleson, 1996; Ford & Ogilvie, 1996; Spender, 1996)

·       Legitimate peripheral participation: short of full participation, a novice is not fully accepted within the community (is short of legitimacy), and lacks belonging (remains peripheral)

·       Crucially, therefore, LPP suggests that learning is embedded in power relations and processes of identity formation, an insight markedly absent in mainstream accounts (Contu & Wilmott, 2003)

Contu & Wilmott (2003) sought, from a post-structuralist perspective, to pay more sustained attention to how learning practices are embedded in relations of power. For them: 

·       power is articulated through social practices that produce the “truths” that make up our self-concepts and the institutions in which our selves are embedded

·       power is not exercised by sovereign individual, but is located in social practices and the relationships on which such practices are built

·       power relations accordingly operate to either facilitate or impede learning processes

The ‘radical’ view (Lukes, 1974)

This views organisations as arenas of domination whereby the powerful are in control of socialisation processes and political agendas. Those in dominant positions wield power through shaping

1.     common ideologies

2.     common definitions of issues and

3.     common beliefs

In each of these three views there is an implicit recognition that actors have real, material interests. However, in the radical view of Lukes, actors are not always aware of what their real interests are. Power, accordingly, can be exercised subconsciously – disconnected from any notion of intent. I could argue that this is certainly the case in classrooms where the teacher wields all the power, even though they are not necessarily aware of this ‘power’ and of their potential to shape ‘common beliefs’ in their students.

The ‘relational’ view (Foucault, 1982) and post-structuralism

This view questions the tendency…to assume that individuals or groups are sovereign agents or possessors of power. Such sovereignty and agency are, rather, the product of regimes of “power/knowledge” (Contu & Wilmott, 2003). Such regimes find their expression in discourses, and power is located in relationships. In the relational view, power is involved in everything we do and necessarily implies resistance. It is a capillary force and not the property of dominant groups (Fulop & Linstead, 1999). As with the radical view, there is an emphasis on social construction and non-intentionality; on the other hand, post-structuralists question not only whether it is possible to identify what “real” interests are, but also argue for the impossibility of our knowing the material world outside of our preferred discursive constructions.

Two views:

1.     that a material world exists, outside and independent of discourse, about which we can make plausible truth claims. In terms of discourse, agency is attributed to the dominant party. i.e. 'The Gevernment are more powerful than me because they have more power'

2.     that there is also a socially-constructed world ontologically different from the real world. Power may exist in either covert or overt forms; it may or may not involve agential intent that is associated with the perceived real interests of dominant groups. In terms of discourse, a sort of quasi-agency is attributed to the discourse itself. i.e. in the 'real' world the Government don't have any more 'real' power than I do, but their power is created through the influence of their rhetoric/discourse. This feels 'real' because the population share a common perception of their power created through the verbal and written word, but this 'reality' is in fact socially constructed.'

Is this right?

Conclusions

Learning is an outcome of power. But this needs to be made more specific: do unequal relationships of power enhance learning or is learning enhanced when such inequalities are broken down and more equal relations prevail in a community of learners?

Proposition 1:

A degree of domination is required in projects to shape and direct learning processes in line with the project remit and its financial and time constraints.

Proposition 2:

Learning is enhanced when hierarchies are broken down and power relations are (temporarily) set aside. This would appear to have some support in the literature (Dixon, 1997) and has been a fundamental belief at the core of action research efforts aimed at generating learning in development projects through democratic dialogue (Gustavsen, 1992).

Proposition 3:

An outcome of learning processes can be new power relations. Power, or rather newly-configured power relations, might be the outcome of learning.

Week 9: Ethical Issues in Qualitative E-Learning Research

Heather Kanuka and Terry Anderson (2007)

Three main areas of concern among e-Learning researchers:

1. participant consent (informed and voluntary)
2. public vs private ownership (i.e. what is public and what is private)
3. confidentiality and anonymity of the data collected

According to Kant (1956), "the only thing that is good without qualification or restriction is a good will" and "goodwill alone is an unconditioned good".

Contemporary philosophers have reasoned that ethical perspectives are based on two competing views:

1. Deontological: codes of ethics need to be developed with clear, articulate and explicit rules to which researchers must adhere. Deontological perspectives develop and evolve over time and are effective in stable research contexts.
2.  Teleological: an approach to ethics that studies actions in relation to their ends or utility. Ethical behaviour is determined  but the consequence of an act, or the greatest social good and the least social harm. Teleological solutions can evolve rapidly as actors closely observe the results of their behaviour and adjust their ethical guidelines in response to observed results.

Rule-based solutions (e.g. deontological) are attractive in situations that that lack clear prescriptive guidelines. Specifically, if during the enquiry process researchers find themselves in a situation that raises ethical issues following a prescriptive set of rules is desirable (Bernard, 1999). 

In contrast, ethical relativism (e.g. the teleological view) requires researchers to look beyond the rules to either immediate or long-term effects or consequences as a basis for ethical action. The value of this action rests on the need for researchers to self-reflect on their research practices and assume responsibility for the consequences of their actions when conducting research.

Early researchers on e-learning have tended to apply ethical guidelines from a pre-internet context (Anderson & Kanuka, 2003). McLuhan (1964) pointed out that we tend to interpret new media through our experience of older media. With respect to mediated learning research on the Net, we have also tended to interpret Net-based communication technologies through our experiences with older mediated communication technologies (Kanuka, 2002).

Unanswered questions:

• is consent required when investigating postings in a public forum, such as public mailing lists or chat rooms, or are these communication forums considered private spaces (does a password imply these forums are private?)
• If so, who is the consent required from? The mailing list owner? The participants? Both?
• Who owns the data? The posting author? The owner of the server? All three?

 

Consent

 

• Except in cases where deception is relatively benign and integral to the research purpose, informed and voluntary consent must be obtained from all participants.
• In the few cases when consent is not obtained before participation, it must be obtained as soon as possible after participation, usually in debriefing sessions immediately following the researcher's intervention.
• Researchers must ensure that there are realistic and accessible options for participants who do not wish to participate in the research (i.e. they may not want to participate but may not have the option to attend the same course at a different time).

Researchers need to provide:

• a statement of the research purpose
• the identity of the researcher
• the expected duration of the research
• the nature of the participation, and
• a description of research procedures.

Some options:

• some researchers and institutions have argued that ethics approval (which includes informed consent) is need only when textual data contain information that allow identification of participants.
• specifically, if the data can be disembodied (stripped of login names) with, for example, search and replace features of analysis software, the data can then be used without ethics approval (Garrison & Anderson, 2003)
• Fahy & Spencer (2004) went further, maintaining that when text-based discussion transcripts are stripped of identifying markers, then they become secondary data and, therefore, their use does not require ethics approval. However, the inclusion of textual course transcripts (i.e. discussion forums) as a secondary data source has not been widely adopted by many research institutions.  

More issues:

• Is it enough to get approval for the possibility of research on human subjects, or do participants have the right to the specifics of the research adn specifics of how information from and about them is to be used or stored?
• If so, can researchers gain this level of specificity when they migh thave many types of investigation and secondary analysis in mind?
• Can archived e-learning course transcripts that have been stripped of personal identifiers (e.g. names, locations) but include th personal thoughts and opinions of the course participants be categorised as secondary data?
• Even when the transcripts are stripped of personal identifiers, is there still a risk of being identified through personal expression, for example, the instructor?
• Should the rights of the majority be overruled by the rights of the minority?

Wherever possible, we try to obtain a signed statement of consent from each participant, which we believe can best protect the researcher, the researcher's institution, funding sources, and research participants. 

Does obtaining consent for certain populations and people over the internet outweigh the possible risks of attracting unauthorised participants? 

 

Privacy, confidentiality, anonymity 

 

• Privacy: refers to the research participants' right to control the access of others to information about them, 
• Confidentiality: how information collected in the study will be kept secure and private (e.g. through controlled access). Terms of confidentiality are usually tailored to the needs of the participants. 
• Anonymity: refers to the removal of any unique characteristics (e.g. names, addresses, affiliated institutions, geographical areas) that would allow unique identification of participants.

Understanding participants' need for privacy, confidentiality, or anonymity is a way in which a researcher respects the participants and is deemed a fundamental requirement of ethical practice among education researchers.

This respect is shown most clearly by allowing the participants to share in the responsibility for decision making that affects them and in particular to share knowledgeably in the decision to participate (or not) in a research project.

To make decisions appropriately and knowledgeably, the participant must be informed of all the relevant details of the research, with an opportunity to refuse to participate.

BUT: How should we define a sense of privacy when privacy is a matter of individual perception and experience?

Ethics are socially constructed.

Sustaining ethical research on the Net must rest not only on guiding principles outlined by external committees and authorities but also on the personal integrity ot the researcher and the kind of goodwill described by Kant (1956).

Week 9: Ethics of Internet Research - contesting the human subjects research model

Bassett, E. and O'Riordan, K. (2002)

Wide range of internet research, e.g.

• virtual ethnography
• linguistic and discourse-bases analyses of computer-mediated communication
• research into the internet as a culture

The perception of the internet as a social domain as led to the widespread application for the human subjects research (HSR) model in internet research. HSR ethics regards the rights of the human subject as primary and the aims of the researcher as secondary. Strong argument for use of HSR model when conducting research into activity such as email between individuals and groups, particularly when groups and individuals use CMC to convey 'private' material through channels that have some mechanism to limit access.

But when applied indiscriminately HSR model risks subsuming the human subject into the technology and merging the textuality of the internet. In a climate of fast developing technologies it is often difficult to define the actual object of internet research precisely. The cost of this blanket approach may be a resulting failure to analyse the significant textuality of internet media.

The internet is not simply a virtual space in which human actors can be observed: it is a medium through which a wide variety of statements are produced.

The internet is not simply a text-based medium made up of communities, newsgroups and email lists. It is also a medium of publication, and significantly one where users can take control of the means of production, create their own cultural artifacts and intervene in the production of existing ones. The internet can thus be perceived as a form of cultural production, in a similar framework to that of broadcast, TV & radio.

Three models to consider:

1. Text as reflection of the author.

• 'text as a precursor to the virtual self'. Literature as a textual opening into the mind of the revered author (text as reflection), or the 'conflation of text and author'. "Great literature is the product of Great Men, and its value lies chiefly in allowing us intimate access to their souls" (Terry Eagleton, 1983). A 'mind made word'.

2. Text as object

• The School of New Criticism challenged the above viewpoint in the post-war period, and was concerned with the interpretation of texts. With New Criticism, the text-as-virtual-writer is replaced by the text-as-object, severed from context, authorial intent, and the response of the reader. Akin to semiotics, it proposed that the meaning of the text lay solely in the language used, regardless  of the intentions of the author at the point of writing. The text was considered to be an organic whole and not a window onto the soul of the author. The text, now considered a elf-sufficient object, was also liberated from both social and historical context of production. 
• The assumption that a piece of text is an object underlies the logic of copyright law. IN copyright law, the text is not akin to a window onto the author's soul but more akin to a box. The contents belong to the author and s/he is free to distribute them and adapt them as s/he wishes. The author sells the distribution of the text, either in units, receiving payment each time the text is reproduced, or outright, by signing the authorial rights over to a publisher for a certain length of time. The reader, by buying a copy of the book, purchases the right to read the work but does not acquire the rights to redistribute it. The author has a right to be recognised as the author of the text, but this means recognition of the fact that s/he owns the text and produced it, not that the text relfects her point of view.
• The registration of the copyright of texts distributed via the Internet counters the notion that the internet is a purely spatial realm.

3. Text as 'reader-response'

• The text separates the author from the reader "...the book divides the act of writing and the act of reading into two sides, between which there is no communication. The text thus produces a double-eclipse of the reader and the writer" (Ricoeur, 1981). The resulting separation between author, text and reader prompts the question of to what degree a text can be said to have any intentional or reflective meaning. "[as] the meanings of the text are the 'production' or 'creation' of the individual reader... there is no one correct meaning, either of the linguistic parts or of the artistic whole of the text" (Abrams, 1941).
• The notion that the meaning of a text is brought about in the process of reading - i.e. that the reader constitutes the text - contests the principles of objective and positivist research. In these paradigms the role of the researcher is to uncover the 'truth' of the object of study. This principle does not only apply to the study of inanimate objects: it is a traditional tenet of anthropological research that the researcher attempt to leave the object of enquiry unchanged. 
• Contemporary research perspectives acknowledge the impossibility of conducting research without altering the meaning of what is observed. This view holds that the meaning of any situation or text does not exist prior to observation, but is inscribed in the process of research. This understanding has led to the use of reflective and 'participant-observation' methodologies that clearly convey the participatory role of the researcher.
• 'Post-paradigm' anthropology and feminist sociological research both require the researcher to account for the dynamics of the relationship between researched, researcher and results. Feminist documentary and film-making has also stressed the relationship between the observed or filmed and the producer of the text. In these paradigms the text is a contested and multiple output with a multiplicity of stakeholders. In other words: the implication for the social construction of knowledge through research is that it is a contested an relational construct.

Question: is it okay to quote a dialogue you copied from a chatroom?

1. The chatroom is a 'space' and the dialogue is between people in it, all of whom are due the protection accorded them under the human subjects research model.
2. The dialogue you have is a 'text', it's in the public domain, and therefore, aside from considerations of copyright, is available for reproduction.

Online communities simultaneously commodify identity and utopian desire, working through a liberal agenda of identity without exclusion, to maximise market share whilst capitalising on fragmentation.

The decision to disguise online activity, justified through the use of a rhetoric of 'protection' may result in furthering the unequal power relations of media production by blocking full representation of alternative media.

Conclusion: advice for internet researchers

Spatial descriptions of the internet are consistent with the Human Subjects Research model, BUT only some types of Internet use can usefully be described in spatial terms. Academic research that positions the internet as a social space containing cultural activity ripe for observation ignores the range of textual applications that the internet supports.

As internet researchers, we need to develop models that acknowledge both spatial and textual understandings of the internet. Such models are required if we are to produce research that examines the complex intersection of technologies, form, genre, and content that the internet supports.

Users may be less informed about the issues involved in textual production via the internet than in print media or traditional broadcast media such as the radio or television. However, researchers cannot afford to assume that individuals engaging in cultural practices through the internet are always at more risk than those using other media.

If an individual or group has chosen to use internet media to publish their opinions then the researcher needs to consider their decision to the same degree that they would with a similar publication in traditional print media.

To maintain a research model akin to the HSR model would be to risk impeding and potentially eliminating promising research. It is not always possible, for example, to gain the consent of a large number of participants who may have changed their email address or ceased posting to a web site on which the material under research is located. This should not prevent research of textual material that they have chosen to output via the internet anymore than it would for textual products in other print or broadcast media.

We should attempt to find a way of acknowledging the hybridity of the internet, acknowledging that the texts it supports are neither virtual selves nor objects completely distinct from those who write them. A reading of the text that includes the content, form, history and researchers' response all need to be considered as part of these relations of production, and power is a central issue. These relations include, for example, statements of intention in the text about whether it is intended for publication or for consumption by a circumscribed group of people... These relations will effect how users perceive their acts of participation and production: for example, is the site like a public forum / message board, or is it more like a newsletter intended only for members of a group? These structures clearly contribute to the user's perceptions of their activity on it.

Commonly deployed spatial models of the internet appear to be seeing a resurgence through the dominant construction of the internet as a place in which human subjects act. We argue that a hybrid model of relational ethics that incorporates text, space and bodies needs to be applied to Internet research. The HSR model only has limited application, and where it is applied indiscriminately or as the 'safest' option it in fact can be unethical and not 'safe' at all.

___________________________________________________________________________________

Key points from online discussion: \

https://modules.lancs.ac.uk/mod/forum/discuss.php?d=22328

From David Pike:

Hi Sue,

Using your "obligation to protect people" and a bit of googling about the idea of duty of care (which seemed like a good phrase) I found there's something called the Caparo Test........so with some intellectual alchemy I would say........

1) If you send/bring/encourage students, assuming no prior experience, to an place/community online/part of an environment - you have an obligation to protect

2) If you gather the students who are part of an existing network e.g. Facebook - you have an obligation to protect only within the bubble you create

3) If you cause students to create new artefacts which are displayed out on the internet you have an obligation to protect by ensuring that students know the rights they hold in relation to said 'things' (i'm thinking of art students, musicians, maketeers, programmers etc).

4) If in any of the cases above you will be working with a group who could / are considered vunerable [e.g 1 perhaps something like the definition and who is sections?] [e.g. 2 - defined as a child] you automatically have an obligation to protect

What does everyone think? Question is, how? This probably varies by technology.....

___________________________________________________________________________________

From Nafeth:

Hello David and Ayman,

I believe that users don't have to learn the technical stuff of information security terminologies to be safe. A big part of the responsibility is on the owners of the websites. One thing they can do is to exercise the 'Due Care' standard that is a the minimum and customary practice of responsible protection of information published through the website. Due care is exercised to ensure that appropriate controls are implemented . Applying this standard implies reasonable care and competence.

___________________________________________________________________________________

Week 8: final comment from Mary Hamilton

Original post: https://modules.lancs.ac.uk/mod/forum/discuss.php?d=23783

We have touched on this during the past week: for example Steve's posting about his perspective as a practitioner pointed out 'how the validity of qualitative, interpretive forms of enquiry need to consider strongly the values of the researcher and the researched'. He states his own overriding interest in researching  'to make a difference to his and others' practice'. This is a strong statement about relevance and purpose which some of us may share, while others may have equally strong but other ideas about the goal of the enquiries we would like to pursue.

 

I conclude from this that while the choice of research methods are certainly to do with underpinning philosophical ideas and with practicalities, values also play a big part. 

 

In particular the  kind of relationship a researcher has or wants to have with their respondents, site gatekeepers, funders etc. is crucial. Who does the research make a difference to? Who will see it as relevant and for what purpose? Who has the power to define the research and make other decisions about it? 

 

Often as a researcher you have to, or want to, share this power. In other cases you accept the role of expert and make the decisions yourself. Perhaps in some mixed method designs you are playing more than one role, speaking to different audiences so you want to work with respondents to voice their understandings of the phenomenon in question, but you also  need to compare these findings with a more externally or pre-defined set of descriptions that will speak to the concerns of a funder or some other stakeholder group. 

 

It is conventional these days in a thesis to include a discussion about these issues in which you reflect on your stance as a researcher. There are even theories about how to do this well, such as "standpoint theory" that requires you to be rigorously analytical about what your own position is in the network of relationships and interests you are working within and to communicate this to your readers so they can judge for themselves what kinds of bias or limitations you bring to the research. If anyone is interested in pursuing this, I am happy to offer some references to follow up. For the moment you may feel you have more than enough to be going on with!

 

Week 8: "Isms" in information science: constructivism, collectivism and constructionism

Talja, S., Tuominen, K. and Savolainen, R. (2004)

Constructivism, collectivism and constructionism differ in their views of knowledge and language.

• Constructionism takes discursive practices as its research object and perceives the production of knowledge in discourses as the primary context for information behaviour and knowledge organisation.

• Collectivism takes professions and knowledge domains as its research object and sees the information and communication practices of professions and domains as the promary context for information behaviour and knowledge organisation.

• Cognitive Constructivism takes individual searchers and their interaction with information retrieval systems as its research object and takes the view that work tasks provide the primary context for information behaviour.

Constructivism: a view in which an individual mind constructs reality but within a systematic relationship to the external world (Gergen, 1999) e.g. Piaget.

Social Constructivism: while the mind constructs reality in its relationship to the world, this mental process is significantly informed by influences from societal conventions, history and interaction with significant others (Gergen, 1999: 60). e.g. Vygotsky and later works of Bruner.

Cognitive Constructivism: sees knowledge production as the creation of mental models. HUmans cannot be 'given' information which they can immediately understand, instead they must 'constructu' their own knowledge. An information user is not a passive information processing system but actively makes sense of the surrounding reality and attaches personal meanings to information.

Social Constructionism: the primary emphasis is on discourse as the vehicle through which the self and the world are articulated. (Gergen, 1999: 60) e.g. Bakhtin, Wittgenstein, Foucault. Constructionism sees language as constitutive for the construction of selves and the formation of meanings. Constructionism speaks of discourses, articulations and vocabularies, and replaces the concept of cognition with conversations. We produce and organise social reality together by using language. The main assumption of constructionism is that the boundaries of social knowledge are set by discourses that categorise the world and bring phenomena into view.

Collectivism: the core assumption of collectivism is that it is a mistake to psychologise issues like relevance and user needs as users are social and cultural beings. Collectivist approaches emphasise that information processes should be seen as embedded in social, organisational and professional contexts. hey shift attention from individual knowledge structures to "knowledge-producing, knowledge-sharing and knowledge-consuming communities" (Jacob & Shaw, 1998: 142).

Activity theory: suggest that an individual lives within a world that is at once physically, socially and subjectively constructed, and that living and actin in this world constitutes knowledge (Jacob & Shaw, 1998: 142).

Table 1: Major features, influences and representatives of cognitive constructivism, collectivism & constructionism

Taylor (1986: 35) stated that it is predominantly "organisation that provides the context and establishes the tasks and responsibilities form which problems, and hence, information needs, are generated". He argued that different professions are socialised into their own world views, i.e. CEOs define and solve problems in the same way in Miami and Helsinki, and that the information behaviour of teachers is similar in Pretoria and Portland (Taylor, 1991: 227). According to Taylor professions are the builders of their specific information universes.

"Knowledge is formed through a dialectical relationship between a community and its members... mediated by language and influenced by the history of the specific [domain]" (Hjorland and Albrechtsen, 1995: 407).

Table 2: Major fields of application of cognitive constructivism, collectivism and constructionism in Information Systems:

Axiology - the theory of value

Definition: the philosophical study of goodness, or value, in the widest sense of these terms.

• Instrumental value: what is good as a means, being good for some purpose

• Intrinsic value: what is good as an end

• Technical value: being good at doing something

• Contributory value: being good as part of a whole

• Final value: being good as a whole

What is intrinsically good?

Hedonists say it is pleasure; Pragmatists, satisfaction, growth, or adjustment; Kantians, a good will; Humanists, harmonious self-realization; Christians, the love of God. Pluralists, such as G.E. Moore, W.D. Ross, Max Scheler, and Ralph Barton Perry, argue that there are any number of intrinsically good things. Moore, a founding father of Analytic philosophy, developed a theory of organic wholes, holding that the value of an aggregate of things depends upon how they are combined.

Whereas such descriptive sciences as sociology, psychology, anthropology, and comparative religion all attempt to give a factual description of what is actually valued, as well as causal explanations of similarities and differences between the valuations, it remains the philosopher’s task to ask about their objective validity. The philosopher asks whether something is of value because it is desired, as subjectivists such as Perry hold, or whether it is desired because it has value, as objectivists such as Moore and Nicolai Hartmann claim. 

Ontology, Epistemology, Methodology, methods and sources

Ontology:

What we believe constitutes social reality. This helps us to understand how different scholarly traditions embedded in fundamentally different cultural contexts can have different views of the world and different assumptions supporting their approaches to social enquiry. Grix (2004) in his book “The Foundations of Research” argue that Ontology is prior to Epistemology.

Ontological problems mainly concern with the nature of social entities: Whether or not social entities can be and should be considered objective (and therefore external) to social actors; or whether social entities could be constructed based on the actions and perceptions of social actors (Bryman & Bell, 2007).

Epistemology:

Epistemology is concerned with the theory of knowledge, especially in regard to its methods, validation and ‘the possible ways of gaining knowledge of social reality’. It is about ‘How what we assumed to exist can be known’

Epistemology focuses on the knowledge-gathering process and is concerned with developing new models or theories that are better than competing models and theories.

Epistomological issues concern the questions of what is (or should be) regarded as acceptable knowledge in a discipline: Whether or not the social world can be and should be studied according to the same principles, procedures, and ethos as the natural science (Bryman & Bell, 2007)


Therefore, each step of these consider different viewpoints:

• Epistomological considerations: Positivism vs Interpretivism. Since Nafeth did mentioned about this, I have no way of improving his explanations

• Ontological considerations: Objectivism vs Constructionism

Objectivism implies an ontological stance that social phenomena confront us as external facts that are beyond our reach or influences.

Constructionism advocates that social phenomena and their meanings are continually being not only built up based on the social interactions but also revised constantly.


Following are two examples of ‘contrasting’ epistemological positions:

• Positivism: this is an epistemological position that advocates the application of the methods of the natural sciences to the study of social reality and beyond

• Interpretivism: an epistemological position that believes that a strategy is required that respects the differences between people and the objects of natural sciences and therefore requires the social scientist to grasp the subjective meaning of social action

Choosing one of these epistemological views will lead you to employ a different methodology than you would if you choose the other.

If Ontology is about what we may know, then Epistemology is about how we come to know what we know.

Our research questions are normally shaped based on our ontological and epistemological positions. This can be thought of as what is explained in the following diagram:

Based on the steps listed above, we can conclude that choosing our methods is based on the research questions posed and the sources of data collected.

On the other hand, some researchers believe that research can start at any of the stages that are listed in the diagram above. For example, a researcher might choose a favourite method and then work reversely through his methodology, epistemology and ontology. This may work, but with extreme care to make sure that all of these components are logically compatible with each other.

Some researchers prefer ‘question-based’ research (using the steps listed in the above figure) while others might opt for ‘method-led research’. You could argue that choosing a research method before having a research question is not logical...