Showing posts with label phenomenography. Show all posts
Showing posts with label phenomenography. Show all posts

Monday, 11 March 2013

Week 8: Paradigmatic Controversies

Lincoln, Y.S. and Guba, E.G. (2000)

(n.b. this article is super-dense...)

N.B. the full discussion around this article can be found here https://modules.lancs.ac.uk/mod/forum/discuss.php?d=22907 - the discussion is more enlightening than the article itself!



How values inform the enquiry process:
  • choice of the problem
  • choice of paradigm to guide the problem
  • choice of theoretical framework
  • choice of major data-gathering and data-analytic methods
  • choice of context
  • treatment of values resident within the context, and 
  • choice of format(s) for presenting findings   
Values constitute a major point of departure between positivist, conventional modes of inquiry and more interpretive forms of enquiry.

Human phenomena are themselves the subject of controversy. Classical social scientists would like to see "human phenomena" limited to those social experiments from which (scientific) generalisations may be drawn.

New-paradigm inquirers, however, are increasingly concerned with the single experience, the individual crisis, the epiphany or moment of discovery, with that most powerful of all threats to conventional objectivity, feeling and emotion.

Social scientists concerned with the expansion of what count as social data rely increasingly on the experiential, the embodied, the emotive qualities of human experience that contribute the narrative quality to life.

"in the Postmodern moment, and in the wake of poststructuralism, the assumption that there is no single "truth" - that all truths are but partial truths; that the slippage between signifier and signified in linguistic and textual terms creates re-presentations that are only and always shadows of the actual people, events, and places; that identities are fluid rather than fixed - leads us ineluctably toward the insight that there will be no single "conventional" paradigm to which all social scientists might ascribe in some common terms and with mutual understanding.

Rather, we stand at the threshold of a history marked by multivocality, contested meanings, paradigmatic controversies, and new textual forms. At some distance down this conjectural path, when its history is written, we will find that this has been the era of emancipation: emancipation from what Hannah Arendt calls "the coerciveness of Truth", emancipation from hearing only the voices of Western Europe, emancipation from generations of silence, and emancipation from seeing the world in one color."

Saturday, 23 February 2013

Week 5: Variation and commonality in phenomenographic research methods

Akerlind, G. (2005)

"For researchers in higher education... the test is generally not in its [phenomenography's] theoretical purity, but in its value in producing useful insights into teaching and learning" (Entwhistle, 1997: 129)

Aims and outcomes of phenomenographic research

Aims of research/researcher: to determine not only a set of different meanings but also a logically inclusive structure relating to the different meanings. To explore the range of meanings within a sample group as a group, not the range of meanings for each individual within the group. So for example, no single interview transcript can be understood in isolation from the others and must instead be interpreted within the context of the group of transcripts or meanings as a whole.

Object of study = variation in human meaning, understanding, conceptions (Marton, 1981) and awareness or ways of experiencing a particular phenomenon (Marton & Booth, 1997).

Outcomes = categories of description, i.e. qualitatively different meanings of ways of experiencing the phenomenon and the structural relationships linking these different ways of experiencing. These relationships represent the structure of the outcome space. The assumption of structural relationships between different ways of experiencing is one of the assumptions about the nature of knowledge and how it is acquired that underlies the phenomenographic approach.
  • "There is not a real world 'out there' and a subjective world 'in here'. The world [as experienced] is not constructed by the learner, nor is it imposed upon her; it is constituted by an internal relationship between them. (Marton & Booth, 1997: 13)
'Outcome space': the structured set of categories of description put forward by the researcher to represent different ways of experiencing a phenomenon. This provides a way of looking at collective human experience of phenomena holistically, despite the fact that some phenomena may be perceived differently by different people and under different circumstances.

Ideally, the outcomes represent the full range of possible ways of experiencing the phenomenon in question, at this particular point in time, for the population represented by the sample group collectively.

Proposition: that ways of experiencing represent a relationship between the experiencer and the phenomenon being experienced. This leads to the expectation that different ways of experiencing will be logically related through the common phenomena being experienced.

Core assumption: that different categories of description or ways of experiencing a phenomenon are logically related to one another, typically by way of hierarchically inclusive relationships (Marton & Booth, 1997).

Data collection: phenomenographic interviews are typically audio taped and transcribed verbatim, making the transcripts the focus of the analysis. The set of categories or meanings that result from the analysis are not determined in advance, but 'emerge' from the data in relationship with the researcher.

Data analysis

Analysis usually starts with a search for meaning, or variation in meaning, across interview transcripts. This is then followed by a search for structural relationships between meanings. In the early stages the researcher should display a high degree of openness to possible meanings, with subsequent readings focusing more on particular aspects or criteria. The ultimate aim is to shed light on the whole by focusing on different perspectives at different times.

Categories of description begin to be formulated by identifying key qualitative similarities within and differences between the categories. In practical terms, transcripts or selected quotes are grouped and regrouped according to perceived similarities and differences along varying criteria. At times the groupings are made before explicit description of the similarities and differences, while at other times the groupings are made according to tentative descriptions for categories, as a checking and validation procedure.

Things to consider:
  1. how much of each transcript is considered at one time during the analysis
  2. the emphasis placed on analytic collaboration with other researchers
  3. variation in ways of practically managing the large amounts of data involved
  4. the degree to which the logical structure of the outcome space is seen as needing to emerge as directly as possible from the data versus more explicitly reflecting the professional judgement of the researcher
  5. use of communicative and pragmatic validity checks
  6. use of coder and dialogic reliability checks







Thursday, 21 February 2013

Week 5: The phenomenology of 'approach to studying'

Ashworth, P. & Greasley, K. (2009)

Key points:

  • the two traditions of approaches to studying literature are inadequate in the same way: the both focus on mental orientation (noesis) and neglect the person's view of the material to be learned (noema)
  • the 'material to be learned' is not easily described, but is intrinsically related to the 'lifeworld' of the student
  • an idiographic sensibility (i.e. realisation of the inescapability of the personal lifeworld) is necessary, both in educational research and education generally
  • the world we act in, the world of our comportment is the subjective lifeworld, no other. There is no call to look inside for the idiographic. Introspection is not the methodology of phenomenology, description of lived experience is.
  • A student's approach to learning is not simple but is idiographic, and entails the meaning of the particular instance of learning within the lifeworld of that individual.
  • Student diversity in studying cannot be easily 'factored in' to pedagogy - an idiographic sensibility is required. This is so despite the undoubted inconvenience of such a pedagogy within the current mass higher education structures.
  • Pedagogically, there is no escape from addressing idiosyncracy in facilitating learning. If so, the implications within mass higher education would be very great.

 

Key definitions:

  • noesis: the manner in which studying is grasped / the mental orientation to studying
  • noema: the subjective meaning of studying and of what is studied
  • Idiographic sensibility: an awareness of the individuality of the lifeworld of the student (this is needed to obtain a fuller understanding of a person's approach to studying
  • phenomenograhy: the process by which someone approaches learning 
  • bracketing: the strict discounting of all reference to objective reality 

 

The phenomenography of approaches to studying

Saljo (1979) conducted qualitative research with university students. From their responses to the question 'What do you actually mean by learning?' Saljo identified five different conceptions of learing:
  1. Learning is simply the increase of knowledge (surface)
  2. Learning is memorising (surface)
  3. Learning is the acquisition of facts, procedures etc, which can be retained and/or utilised in practice (surface)
  4. Learning is abstraction of meaning. The learning material is the starting point for a construction on the part of the learner (deep)
  5. Learning is an interpretive process aimed at understanding - learning as seeing something in a different way (Marton, Dall'Alba & Beaty, 1993) (deep). These authors also added a sixth conception:
  6. Learning as entailing a change in the learner themselves (deep)
Marton et al. (1993) argued that student conceptions of learning would be closely aligned to the approach that they took to learning. 

Learning is relational because it involves a combination of two factors:
  1. the 'how' - i.e. the activity of the student in learning
  2. the 'what' - i.e. the nature of the thing to be learned
Learning is there fore a relation between the learner and the material to be learned (Ashworth & Greasley, 2009). However, phenomenography has been criticised for failing to accommodate 'life activities' - e.g. this material, that learning situation.

What is distinctive about phenomenologically-based empirical work is that it focus it the person's experience as such. All reference to objective reality is set aside - this is 'bracketing'. Reality is 'bracketed' and attention is turned to experience alone. All phenomenological investigation is exclusively concerned with the subjectivity of the individual (A&G, 2009).

A&G's question: is it possible for a researcher to set aside presuppositions and enter into the pure experience of the research participant?

A criticism of phenomenograpic and psychometric approaches to learning is that they don't take into consideration the student's awareness of the actual material to be learned (the 'noema'), with all its connotations for them personally. Phenomenography neglects that the meaning of the phenomenon comes from its embeddedness within the broad experience of the student - i.e. phenomenography detaches the person from their world (Ashworth & Lucas 1998, 2002).

Example: a dyslexic student views text as 'the enemy' and therefore avoids it wherever possible.
  • text as an enemy = noema: an aspect of the intentional object of learning
  • text avoidance = noesis: as aspect of the mental orientation to text
Error: you shouldn't distinguish between the 'object as it is intended' (appearance) and the 'object which is intended' (reality) (Willard, 1992). Heidegger (1927/1988) dismisses the distinction between noesis and noema because, although analytically separable, they are never actually apart in existence. He argues that:
  • we understand ourselves and our existence by way of the activities we pursue and the things we take care of (phenomenology of intentionality)
  • the world is inevitably subjective, "different in a certain way for each of us" 
A&G therefore argue that:
  •  the phenomenological world (i.e. the world of experience as it appears for the person) should not be brought together with an assessment of the 'reality of the situation in a research design
  • we remain in the phenomenological realm and find that the world through and through is a subjective one. The noesis must not be interpreted as 'on the side of the person' and the noema as 'on the side of the world'. We are already within the world - which is or subjective lifeworld. Our whole comportment relates to this world.
  • the world is interesting in ways which are precisely my interests.
  • intentionality is not simply 'all consciousness is consciousness of something' but rather 'all things of which I am conscious are structured in forms which reflect - or are - my orientations and concerns.

 

The 'fragments of the lifeworld'

Selfhood: what does the situation of learning mean for social identity, the person's sense of agency and their feeling of their own presence and voice in the situation?

Sociality: how does the situation affect relations with others?

Embodiment: How does the situation relate to feelings about their own body, including gender, disabilities and emotions?

Temporality: How is the sense of time, duration, biography entailed in approaches to learning?

Spatiality: How is the student's picture of the geography of the places they need to go to and act within affected by the situation? Frustrations? Possibilities?

Project: How does the situation relate to the student's ability to carry out the activities they are committed to and which they regard as central to their life? Regrets? Pride? What is the meaning of this material  for this learner?

Discourse: What sort of terms - educational, social, commercial, ethical etc - are employed to describe - and thence to live - the situation?
  

Tuesday, 19 February 2013

Week 5: Phenomenology & Phemonenography

Wilson (2002)


Phenomenology


Phenomenology is a philosophical school concerned with how people make sense of the world. It examines how a person's consciousness organises and classifies his or her knowledge and experience.
It originated through the work of Edmund Husserl and was expanded further by Alfred Schutz. According to some interpretations it can also be a methodological approach.

Aim

  • to comprehend the meaning of things as seen through the eyes and mind of particular groups or individuals (Trowler - PhD tutor)
  • to study human phenomena without considering questions of their causes, their objective reality, or even their appearances (Wilson, 2002)
  • to study how human phenomena are experienced in consciousness, in cognitive and perceptual acts, as well as how they may be values or appreciated aesthetically (Wilson, 2002)
  • to understand how persons construct mearning
Phenomenology is not a hypothesis testing mode of research (although it may result in hypotheses that we may wish to test by other means), nor is it one that must be guided by theoretical models. Rather, one is urged to get as close as possible to what the participants in the behaviour of interest are experiencing. Rather, It is about the nature of human experience and the meaning that people attach to their experiences. In trying to arrive at this kind of understanding, the researcher is asked to 'bracket', or suspend belief in the phenomena of the external world, to put them aside and focus on the consciousness of that world (Wilson 2002).


Definitions


  • Typifications: shared understandings of categories
  • Commonsense knowledge: groups of typifications comprise 'commonsense knowledge' for communities and this allows them to impose meaning on the world (Trowler). 
  • Phenomenography: 'drawing understandings of the world' (Trowler)
  • Intersubjectivity: experiencing the world with and through others. Human experience of the world is 'intersubjective'. Whatever meaning we create has its roots in human actions, and the totality of social artefacts and cultural objects is grounded in human activity (Wilson, 2002)

People construct their social life through interaction with others. It does not matter if their interpretations are 'true' - this is not a concern of phenomenology. 

Phenomenography


Phenomenography is a method of research, as opposed to phenomenology which is a philosophical school of thought. That said, it is still largely based on phenomenological tenets. 

Aim: to examine the variation in 'ways of seeing something'. Schutz's methodology starts from the idea that the difference between social research and physical sciences research is that the former involves the participation of 'research objects' (i.e. people) who are 'themselves interpreting the social world that we, as scientists, are also aiming to analyse. (Wilson 2002)

Outcome:  various categories of description called an 'outcome space'. These are usually related to each other, often in a hierarchical format, where those above include but go beyond the descriptions of those below. 

How does it work? Usually by interviewing, followed by detailed analysis of interview transcriptions to identify the 'outcome space'. In analysing the world it is inevitable that we employ the same methods of interpretation as the person whom we are studying. Therefore the social scientist must adopt the position of the 'disinterested observer': he or she has no involvement in the life of the observee. The goals of the observee 'are not of any practical interest, but only of cognitive interest' (Wilson 2002).

By operating in such a manner the researcher builds models of human action, of which the general 'postulates' are:


  1. the postulate of logical consistency, whereby the objective validity of the scientist's constructs are guaranteed and are distinguished from the constructs of everyday life;
  2. the postulate of subjective interpretation, whereby the scientist can refer '...all kinds of human action or their result to the subjective meaning such action or result of an action had for the actor.", and
  3. the postulate of adequacy: that is, the constructs created by the researcher should be understandable by the individual social actor and his/her fellows. Compliance with this postulate ensures that the scientific constructs are consistent with the constructs of common-sense experience of the social world (Wilson 2002).

Schutz also examines how socially-derived knowledge originates and, again, uses ideal types to explore this phenomenon. Apart from ourselves, as the central (to our minds) figures in social interaction, he suggests that the sources of socially-acquired knowledge can be seen as four ideal types:

  1. the eyewitness, that is, someone who reports to me something that he or she has observed in the world within that person's reach;
  2. the insider: someone who, because of his relationship to a group which is more direct than my own, is able to report some event, or the opinions of others, with the authority of sharing the same system of relevance as the other members of the group. I accept the insider's information as 'true' or valid, at least in part, because the insider's knowledge of the context of the situation is deeper than my own;
  3. the analyst: someone who shares my system of relevances, who has collected information and organized that information in conformity with that system of relevance; and
  4. the commentator: someone who does not share my system of relevances, but who has collected information in the same way as the analyst and has presented that information in such a way that I can form 'a sufficiently clear and precise knowledge of the underlying deviating system of relevances' (Wilson 2002).
Again, each of us may, at different times and in different circumstances, take roles that fit these ideal types.


Methodology vs Method


Wilson points out that people often misuse the term 'methodology' by using it simply to describe the 'method' of conducting a research study. He states that methodology "is prior to method and more fundamental, it provides the philosophical groundwork for methods. To state one's methodological position is to describe one's view of the nature of reality: for the positivist, the methodological position is that the facts of the world represent real objects, while for the phenomenologist, the world (or at least the one he/she chooses to explore) is one of intersubjectively constructed meanings" (Wilson 2002).