Organisation Science, Vol. 10, No. 4. pp.381-400.
Epistemology = questions what knowledge is and how it is acquired.
Treating knowledge as something people possess = the "epistemology of possession". But this way of understanding knowledge does not take into account the knowing that resides in the practice of groups and individuals. Hence the authors argue that "knowing as action calls for an "epistemology of practice"".
The authors argue that there are four different types of knowledge, explicit, tacit, individual and group, each distinctly different from the other and with each fulfilling a function that the others cannot. 'Knowledge' and 'knowing' are also understood as distinctly different, with knowledge positioned as a tool of knowing, and with each enabling the other. If knowing is interpreted as one aspect of the way in which we interact with each other and physical world, then the interaction between knowing and knowledge "can generate new knowledge and new ways of knowing". The authors label this interaction a generative dance, and believe it to be a powerful driver of innovation in organizations.
Of particular significance is the authors' statement that "harnessing this innovation calls for organizational and technological infrastructures that support the interplay of knowledge and knowing". The use of social media tools in organizations can be seen as constituting precisely this sort of infrastructure, as these tools enable employees and managers to access, manage and make use of the "intellectual capital" of the organization. Cook and Brown's work also positions the need to understand knowledge and knowing as core competencies, and it can be argued that effective use of social tools for knowledge management and curation is increasingly a key element in supporting effective work and innovation in organizations.
'Explicit' knowledge can be understood as "knowledge that can be spelled out or formalised"
'Tacit' knowledge is "associated with skills or know-how"
The authors highlight Nonaka's belief that although individuals' tacit knowledge may constitute the centre of the process of knowledge creation, practical benefits are only reaped when individuals externalise this knowledge.
Cook and Brown observe the tendency in the literature around organizational knowledge to privilege 'individual' over 'group' knowledge, and 'explicit' over 'tacit' knowledge, and to treat all knowledge as being the same. Ultimately, they believe that failing to acknowledge the distinctions between different types of knowledge severely limits the ability to assess how individuals and groups acquire, maintain and apply competencies.
The authors give an example in the form of the sentence "Robert is fixing cars". This sentence indicates both a knowledge that Robert possesses and an action informed by that knowledge. In terms of knowledge, an accurate account of what Robert is doing requires acknowledgement of both his knowledge and the actions which stem from this. That which is possessed is referred to by the authors as 'knowledge', and that which constitutes action is labelled 'knowing'. While individuals and groups make use of both explicit and tacit knowledge in what they do, Cook and Brown argue that "not everything they know how to do...is explicable solely in terms of the knowledge they possess".
Cook and brown believe that unpacking the relationship between these two epistemologies enables a clearer understanding of:
Cartesian logic - "I think therefore I am" - has informed the conventional understanding of knowledge and the idea that knowledge "is something that is held in the head of an individual and is acquired, modeled, and expressed most accurately in the most objective and explicit terms possible" (1999: 384). But Cook & Brown argue that the dominance of the traditional Cartesian epistemology has hampered a clearer understanding of the distinction between 'tacit' and 'explicit' knowledge. They give the example of riding a bike, stating that explicit knowledge alone would not enable a person to ride - the person would also need the tacit knowledge acquired from having applied that knowledge in the given situation of trying to ride.
Epistemology = questions what knowledge is and how it is acquired.
Treating knowledge as something people possess = the "epistemology of possession". But this way of understanding knowledge does not take into account the knowing that resides in the practice of groups and individuals. Hence the authors argue that "knowing as action calls for an "epistemology of practice"".
The authors argue that there are four different types of knowledge, explicit, tacit, individual and group, each distinctly different from the other and with each fulfilling a function that the others cannot. 'Knowledge' and 'knowing' are also understood as distinctly different, with knowledge positioned as a tool of knowing, and with each enabling the other. If knowing is interpreted as one aspect of the way in which we interact with each other and physical world, then the interaction between knowing and knowledge "can generate new knowledge and new ways of knowing". The authors label this interaction a generative dance, and believe it to be a powerful driver of innovation in organizations.
Of particular significance is the authors' statement that "harnessing this innovation calls for organizational and technological infrastructures that support the interplay of knowledge and knowing". The use of social media tools in organizations can be seen as constituting precisely this sort of infrastructure, as these tools enable employees and managers to access, manage and make use of the "intellectual capital" of the organization. Cook and Brown's work also positions the need to understand knowledge and knowing as core competencies, and it can be argued that effective use of social tools for knowledge management and curation is increasingly a key element in supporting effective work and innovation in organizations.
'Explicit' knowledge can be understood as "knowledge that can be spelled out or formalised"
'Tacit' knowledge is "associated with skills or know-how"
The authors highlight Nonaka's belief that although individuals' tacit knowledge may constitute the centre of the process of knowledge creation, practical benefits are only reaped when individuals externalise this knowledge.
Cook and Brown observe the tendency in the literature around organizational knowledge to privilege 'individual' over 'group' knowledge, and 'explicit' over 'tacit' knowledge, and to treat all knowledge as being the same. Ultimately, they believe that failing to acknowledge the distinctions between different types of knowledge severely limits the ability to assess how individuals and groups acquire, maintain and apply competencies.
The authors give an example in the form of the sentence "Robert is fixing cars". This sentence indicates both a knowledge that Robert possesses and an action informed by that knowledge. In terms of knowledge, an accurate account of what Robert is doing requires acknowledgement of both his knowledge and the actions which stem from this. That which is possessed is referred to by the authors as 'knowledge', and that which constitutes action is labelled 'knowing'. While individuals and groups make use of both explicit and tacit knowledge in what they do, Cook and Brown argue that "not everything they know how to do...is explicable solely in terms of the knowledge they possess".
Cook and brown believe that unpacking the relationship between these two epistemologies enables a clearer understanding of:
- "how individuals and groups can draw on tacit and explicit knowledge simultaneously
- how what individuals know tacitly can be made useful to groups
- how explicit instructions can be made more useful aids for the development of tacit skills"(1999: 383).
Explicit vs Tacit knowledge
Cartesian logic - "I think therefore I am" - has informed the conventional understanding of knowledge and the idea that knowledge "is something that is held in the head of an individual and is acquired, modeled, and expressed most accurately in the most objective and explicit terms possible" (1999: 384). But Cook & Brown argue that the dominance of the traditional Cartesian epistemology has hampered a clearer understanding of the distinction between 'tacit' and 'explicit' knowledge. They give the example of riding a bike, stating that explicit knowledge alone would not enable a person to ride - the person would also need the tacit knowledge acquired from having applied that knowledge in the given situation of trying to ride.
No comments:
Post a Comment